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DAN L. BURK* 
Patent law is capable of prompting innovation across a wide range of technologies 
by virtue of flexible “policy levers” that allow patent standards to be calibrated to the 
impediments that characterize different economic sectors.  But it has become increasingly 
clear that social bias also raises significant barriers to successful creativity and 
innovation.  In this article, I argue that the same policy levers used to address economic 
impediments to innovation can also be used to address other social impediments to 
innovation.  I offer as a detailed example one doctrinal response to the well-documented 
gender gap in patentable innovation.  I conclude by suggesting that such doctrinal 
“diversity levers” are available to address innovation deficits among other 
underrepresented innovators, but that considerable work remains to identify when and 
where such intervention might be effective. 
INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property, particularly in the form of patents or copyrights, is 
generally understood as providing a means of legal appropriability: encouraging 
beneficial new creations by securing the value of investments in such creations.1  
Because the exclusive rights conferred by a patent or copyright deter 
unauthorized copying or misappropriation of creative work, these intellectual 
property regimes are believed to foster innovations that might otherwise be 
under-produced.  However, it is increasingly clear that in many instances, 
creative production is deterred by social rather than economic impediments.  A 
growing body of scholarship indicates that social biases may erect unexpected 
and underappreciated barriers to the goals of intellectual property systems.  
Indeed, intellectual property laws themselves might inadvertently deter the 
creative activity of certain creators, such as women or racial minorities, and may 
skew new innovation away from disadvantaged communities that most 
desperately need its benefits. 
In this article, I explore how existing features of intellectual property law 
might be deployed to address such impediments to innovation.  In previous 
work, I have discussed certain doctrinal features of patent law, dubbed “policy 
levers,” that allow the patent system to be modulated to match the innovation 
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 1.  See Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN. 
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Licensing, and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986) (outlining costs and benefits of various strategies 
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incentives needed in different economic sectors.2  Here, I argue that the same 
mechanisms may be used to address social impediments to innovation.  While 
such “diversity levers” might be used to correct a variety of social failures in the 
patent system, in this article I will focus my discussion on the pervasive deficit of 
patenting among women who are engaged in technical research.  A substantial 
and growing body of empirical literature demonstrates that women patent and 
commercialize new inventions at only a fraction of the rate of similarly situated 
men, indicating a serious failure in the effectiveness of patent law’s innovation 
incentive.3  I offer as an illustration as to how patents might be calibrated to 
address this failure the example of a particular policy lever that modulates patent 
law’s non-obviousness requirement.  I conclude with some thoughts on how 
other features of the statute might be used to address similar social impediments 
deterring full participation in the innovation system. 
I. PATENTS FOR HUMANITY 
In 2013, the Obama Administration implemented an experimental program 
through the United States Patent Office, dubbed “Patents for Humanity.”4  The 
program, now in its second year, was implemented to encourage innovation in 
the service of economically impoverished and under-served populations.  The 
“Patents for Humanity” program is structured as a competition in which 
companies that hold patents for life-saving or critical infrastructure technologies 
are publicly lauded for deploying such patents in the broader public interest, 
especially in the service of disadvantaged or developing populations.  Such 
award-winning activities have included development and distribution of 
malarial drugs; development of high-protein, vitamin-enhanced sorghum; and 
development and distribution of water purification packets, all targeted toward 
developing nations.5 
This program’s recognition of humanitarian patent activity is not simply 
honorary, but includes a sort of patent prize: Patent holders who receive these 
awards are granted a special certificate that allows them to accelerate 
examination of a subsequent patent through the United States Patent Office.  In 
essence, this is a type of prize for innovative activity that is particularly 
meritorious along a particular dimension— that of humanitarian relief.6  These 
certificates might become even more valuable under legislation recently 
introduced by Senators Patrick Leahy and Chris Coons that would make such 
acceleration certificates transferable, essentially creating a secondary market in 
 
 2. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 
(2003). 
 3. See infra notes 29–46 and accompanying text.  
 4. See Patents for Humanity, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents/init_events/patents_for_humanity.jsp (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).  
 5. Id. 
 6. In this sense the program constitutes a modest experiment toward engaging robust debate 
over whether prizes might serve as a substitute, or perhaps a supplement, to the exclusivity regime of 
patent law. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 303 (2013); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Benjamin 
N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999 (2014); Steven 
Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001). 
Burk Proof_EK_CK_12-23-2015 (Do Not Delete) 1/4/2016  6:12 PM 
 DIVERSITY LEVERS 27 
such certificates.7 
This initiative is intriguing for a variety of reasons, but particularly for what 
it suggests about the purposes and policy of patent law.  Certainly the “Patents 
for Humanity” initiative is laudable simply as an effort to deploy innovation to 
improve human welfare.  But the initiative also marks another, more important, 
and possibly less apparent milestone.  The White House program and the 
accompanying Leahy-Coons bill are striking in their recognition that some types 
of patentable innovation are more desirable than others, not necessarily due to 
the economic value that can be realized from the innovation, but because the 
innovation serves particular social goals such as alleviating suffering, improving 
health, or enhancing human flourishing.  To be sure, at some level each of these 
social benefits may ultimately produce measurable economic benefits, but 
recipients of the White House award are presumably not donating their 
intellectual property to impoverished communities in anticipation of a better 
monetary return on their investment, and the beneficiaries of the donation are 
likely to benefit from such donations in ways entirely out of proportion to the 
value of an accelerated prosecution certificate. 
Additionally, the program implicitly recognizes that some types of socially 
valuable innovation may only occur when innovators are nudged or oriented in 
a particular direction.  The “Patents for Humanity” program offers such 
orientation by means of a modest administrative subsidy coupled with what is 
likely a more valuable reputational reward.  Of course, the underlying patent is 
already a type of subsidy—it entails state-sponsored and legally enforceable 
exclusivity intended to allow the holder to reap profits that would be unavailable 
in a competitive market.  But it is not a direct subsidy, and depends upon an 
otherwise functioning market to license the patent or to sell products embodying 
the claimed technology.  Innovation aimed at impoverished or underdeveloped 
communities may not be properly facilitated by this type of incentive; by 
definition, an impoverished or disadvantaged population has less money to 
spend and perhaps cannot afford the innovation at any price, let alone the 
inflated prices allowed under a patent.  Sometimes sales of an innovation in 
wealthier regions can cross-subsidize lower prices for the innovation in 
impoverished regions, but this strategy may be unavailable where clean water or 
plentiful food supplies, or robust public health measures are already available in 
the wealthy regions—the population that needs the innovation cannot afford it, 
and the population that can afford it does not need it. 
Hence, the extra incentive of a publicly recognized award helps to cure a 
particular type of market failure.  Again, the patent system itself is most often 
described as a remedy to pervasive market failure; the typical justification for 
patents holds that unaided market incentives will not tend to prompt inventions 
with the characteristics of public goods because once such goods are produced 
they will be costlessly appropriated by others besides the innovator who made 
the investment to produce them.8  But to the extent that patents address a market 
failure, it is typically perceived only as a market failure of this particular kind—
 
 7. Patents for Humanity Program Improvement Act of 2012, S. 3652, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2012). 
 8. See Burk, supra note 1 at 402–03.  
Burk Proof_EK_CK_12-23-2015 (Do Not Delete) 1/4/2016  6:12 PM 
28 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 23:25 2015 
specifically, the problem of recouping an investment in easily appropriated 
public goods.  As it stands, the patent system is not necessarily calibrated to 
counter other types of market failures that may stifle creative production, nor is 
it necessarily calibrated to the problem of providing public goods in situations of 
impoverishment, when the problem of undersupply is more extensive or 
pervasive than usually contemplated. 
“Patents for Humanity” approaches these issues by providing an add-on 
incentive to the grant of a patent.  But the problems addressed by this add-on are 
not themselves add-ons; they are integral considerations to the goals of 
intellectual property, and there seems no reason that the exclusive rights 
provided under either patent or copyright must themselves be oriented only 
toward curing the public goods problem.  In the United States, the federal 
intellectual property regimes of patent and copyright are governed by the 
constitutional requirement that they “promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts.”9  Such progress has typically been conceptualized in terms of the 
economic value of innovation prompted by a patent or copyright: the exclusivity 
of a patent or copyright is expected to allow patent holders to restrict output of 
the patented item for a limited term, inflating profits from that item to ensure a 
return on investments made in new creative enterprises, thus making such 
investments more attractive.  The assumption inherent in such a rationale is that 
more innovation is better, so that facilitating more innovation constitutes 
progress. 
But there is no particular limitation explicit in the constitutional text or 
concept of progress that constrains it to an advancement of economic value, or to 
prompting ever more capacious levels of creative output.10  Progress might be 
imbued with different meaning; it might equally well indicate wider 
dissemination of knowledge,11 or it might indicate the generation of works that 
are aesthetically more pleasing.12  Perhaps it could indicate the creation of works 
that are less environmentally burdensome13 or more socially just.14  Even within a 
conventional utilitarian framework, an increase in non-monetary benefits such as 
happiness or dignity might represent progress in social welfare, as more people 
would consider themselves better off.  But the concept of progress need not be 
 
 9. U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
 10. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 
DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993) (questioning the conventional economic understanding of “progress” in the 
Constitution); see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000) 
(questioning whether neo-classical economics offers a neutral understanding of intellectual property 
“progress”). 
 11. Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress" in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001). 
 12. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998); John 
Tehranian, Dangerous Undertakings: Sacred Texts and Copyright's Myth of Aesthetic Neutrality, in THE 
SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 418 (Matthew David & Debora Halbert, eds., 2014).  
 13. See, e.g., Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193 (1991); Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with 
Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51 
(2005); Andrew Torrance, Patent Law, HIPPO, and the Biodiversity Crisis, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 624 (2010). 
 14. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 831, 918 
(2011). 
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confined to utility and might plausibly encompass incommensurables such as 
human flourishing or dignity. 
II. BIAS IN PATENT LAW 
Suggesting that the proper metric for constitutional progress might not be 
solely utilitarian or economic may elicit some protest that intellectual property 
law is merely a mechanism for promoting creativity, and was not intended as the 
vehicle for promoting goals such as equity or social justice.  And yet it should be 
clear from the outset that intellectual property law already promotes certain 
social outcomes with respect to social status, privileges, and opportunities, 
whether those outcomes are intended or not.  Certainly intellectual property 
cannot be entirely value neutral; it is specifically intended to promote particular 
social activity at the expense of other social activity.  Patentable innovation is 
rewarded by exclusivity at the expense of curtailed access to the claimed 
invention, and possibly at the expense of non-patentable innovation, as resources 
are channeled toward projects that qualify for patenting.15  It should not be 
surprising if re-allocation of such resources has disparate or unequal effects. 
But recent scholarship has increasingly recognized that intellectual property 
regimes are not value-neutral with respect to other social goods such as justice 
and diversity.16  To some degree, this should also not be surprising; intellectual 
property is a product of its social milieu, and to the extent that society is 
generally biased to one degree or another by assumptions about race, class, 
gender, or other socially constructed norms, those assumptions might be 
expected to seep into the formulation of intellectual property. 
What may be surprising to some observers is that values not intended or 
explicitly contemplated in the formulation of intellectual property law become 
implicated in its execution.  Unlike areas of the law such as family law or voting 
law or employment law, where issues of social bias are an integral consideration 
to the goals of the law, and so are pervasively considered in its formulation and 
application, intellectual property might be thought of by many observers as 
socially neutral.  The goals and structure of intellectual property law are not 
generally thought of as being associated with race, gender, or other historically 
disadvantaged social classifications. 
And yet on closer examination, what seems ostensibly neutral may hold 
hidden biases.  Recent scholarship examining race-specific drug patenting 
illustrates such unwitting social bias.  Such issues became apparent during the 
controversy over BiDil, a combination of two existing pharmaceuticals, a 
vasodilator and a hypertensive compound, which were the subject of a process 
 
 15. See Burk, supra note 1, at 402–03 (2012) (discussing social costs of exclusive rights in 
intellectual goods).  
 16. See, e.g., Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright Law, 
15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207 (2007); Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretations of Intellectual 
Property, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, 
and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273 (2007); Burk, supra note 14; Laura A 
Foster, Situating Feminism, Patent Law, and the Public Domain, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 262 (2011). 
Kara Swanson, Getting a Grip on the Corset: Gender, Sexuality, and Patent Law, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
57 (2011). 
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patent for use to treat congestive heart failure.17  Both pharmaceuticals were well 
known in the art, and their combination to treat congestive heart failure was 
considered unpatentably obvious by the Patent Office.  The patent was allowed, 
however, after the applicant pointed out that treatment data for the combination 
showed unexpectedly good results among African-American patients, and 
amended the claims of the patent to restrict its scope to a method of treating 
hypertension in that population.18 
The BiDil patent is troubling in part because the exclusive rights in the 
invention are framed in terms of a racial label—“African-American” or 
equivalent terms—designating social constructs rather than scientific 
classifications.19  Individuals with a wide range of physical and genetic 
characteristics might identify or be socially classified as “African-American.”20  
But Jonathan Kahn has pointed out that the claims of this patent additionally 
serve to expose certain troubling features of current patent doctrine.21  In 
particular, the determination of patentable non-obviousness for the treatment 
incorporates a troubling racial assumption.  Patents are only granted to 
inventions that represent a significant advance over the technology that is 
already available; the legal metric for assessing such a level of invention is to 
determine whether the claimed invention, taken as a whole, would have been 
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the patent application 
was filed.22 
Kahn aptly observes that the BiDil combination of drugs could only be 
judged inventive, or non-obvious, if the baseline for judging obviousness is the 
effect of the drugs in the majority Caucasian population.23  An enhanced effect in 
the African-American population is only unexpected or surprising if that 
population is somehow considered to be outside the norm. Not only is there no 
genetic or physiological basis for the social classification, the patent assumes that 
the classification constitutes something aberrant. By examining the framing of 
the obviousness inquiry, it becomes clear that the legal requirement for non-
obviousness intersected with a social classification to set a racial baseline for 
patentability.  Thus, the patent is in some sense premised upon the 
marginalization or “othering” of the African-American social grouping. 
Patent law may similarly incorporate social biases against other 
marginalized classes.  In previous work, I have pointed out several dimensions 
of the U.S. patent statute that intersect with the social construction of gender to 
produce unexpected, aberrant, and largely unappreciated outcomes.24  For 
 
 17. See Howard Brody & Linda M. Hunt, BiDil: Assessing a Race-Based Pharmaceutical, 4 ANN. 
FAM. MED. 556 (2006). 
 18. Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography of Intellectual 
Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353, 379–81 (2006).  
 19. See Brody & Hunt, supra note 17, at 557.  
 20. Nonetheless, there is a long history of racial and ethnic terminology in U.S. patents. See 
Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 
409 (2008). 
 21. Kahn, supra note 18.  
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015). 
 23. Kahn, supra note 18, at 403.  
 24. See Burk, supra note 14.  
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example, the metrics by which the statutory criteria for a patent are measured 
entail a very particular mode of thinking about invention, assuming that it occurs 
by means of certain analytical and rational processes.25  However, both anecdotal 
and empirical evidence suggest that women in Western cultures have been 
socialized to approach problem solving differently than their male counterparts, 
and that they function with different cognitive parameters in a different 
professional and interpersonal milieu.26  Inventive methods that might be labeled 
“intuitive” or “emotive” are more typically associated with and performed by 
those society assigns to the female gender.27  There is no reason to think that such 
approaches necessarily produce less useful or less valuable innovation than 
methods labeled “rational” or “analytical,” and both likely play a role in 
technical creativity.  But the latter approaches are more easily codified and 
documented than the former,28 so they are more amenable to satisfaction of the 
teaching and disclosure requirements of patent law as currently formulated. 
III. THE PATENT GENDER GAP 
Such concerns over the epistemology of the patent statute may seem largely 
speculative or theoretical.  And yet a substantial and growing body of empirical 
evidence demonstrates gendered outcomes associated with patents.  Although 
social and epistemic explanations of this evidence remain elusive, the descriptive 
empirics of gender in the patent system are relatively straightforward: women 
are at every level pervasively absent from the patent system.  In the United 
States, far fewer patent attorneys and patent agents are women than are men.29  
Female inventors account for a relatively small proportion of patent applications, 
even when counted as co-inventors as part of an inventive team.30  This female 
deficit holds true at every career stage and has remained persistent over time, 
with only small recent increases in female inventorship.31  This discrepancy in 
inventorship is not limited to the United States; a number of studies indicate that 
 
 25. See id.at 891–92; see also Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 192–94 (2007) (discussing patent law’s elevation of mental effort over 
physical effort).  
 26. The most classic, influential, but controversial formulation of this proposition remains 
CAROL GILLIAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
 27. See Burk, supra note 14, at 904–05. 
 28. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1009 
(2008) (discussing codification requirements in patent doctrine); see also Peter Lee, Transcending the 
Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1503 (2012) (noting the inability of patents to transmit uncodified or tacit knowledge).  
 29. See Annette I. Kahler, Examining Exclusion in Woman-Inventor Patenting: A Comparison of 
Educational Trends and Patent Data in the Era of Computer Engineer Barbie, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 733, 792 (2011); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Gender Diversity in the Patent Bar, 14 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (2014). 
 30. Jennifer Hunt et al., Why Are Women Underrepresented Amongst Patentees?, 42 RES. POL’Y 831, 
831 (2013). 
 31. See id. One recent commercially commissioned study found a very large uptick in recent 
female inventorship. See NATIONAL WOMEN’S BUSINESS COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS (2012). This finding is sufficiently far out of line with other studies that 
experts in the field have questioned the data collection and analysis. See Karen A. Frenkel, The 
Reporting Gap on the Patent Gender Gap, ACM NEWS (May 30, 2013), http://cacm.acm.org/news/ 
164776- the-reporting-gap-on-the-patent-gender-gap/fulltext (quoting critiques of the study). 
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it is found consistently across multiple jurisdictions.32 
As a general matter it is well known that, despite some progress toward 
gender parity, women continue to enter science and engineering fields in 
substantially smaller numbers than men.33  The failure to attract women into 
science and engineering fields undoubtedly contributes to the smaller total 
number of patents involving women.  But the gender gap in patenting can only 
partially be explained by the lower number of women entering patent-intensive 
sectors involving engineering or the physical sciences.34  Even taking into 
account the absolute number of male and female patentees in such fields, those 
women who do work in these areas acquire patents at a lower rate than their 
male counterparts.35  This does not appear to have changed over time despite 
growing numbers of women entering these fields.36 
Additionally, certain technical sectors, notably biotechnology, are known 
for attracting a higher number of female researchers, but studies of women who 
work in biotechnology show that they still patent at a fraction of the rate of 
similarly situated men.37  This is true both for academic and industrial 
researchers, although the gap is more pronounced in the former field.38  The 
patents that women do acquire in these areas appear to be of equal or greater 
significance as those acquired by male scientists and engineers.39  But women 
who obtain patents are less likely to commercialize them via licensing or product 
development than their male counterparts.40  As in other technical areas, this has 
remained true for successive generations of female scientists over decades, 
despite an increase of women entering the life sciences.41 
  
 
 32. See, e.g., Ranier Frietsch et al., Gender Specific Patterns in Patenting and Publishing, 38 RES. 
POL’Y 590 (2009) (surveying European Patent Office gender data from 14 countries).  
 33. See DAVID N. BEEDE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WOMEN IN STEM: A GENDER GAP TO 
INNOVATION, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION ISSUE BRIEF NO. 04-11 (2011). Because a 
science or engineering background is required to practice before the USPTO, the smaller numbers of 
women holding science and engineering degrees certainly helps explain why women are 
underrepresented among patent agents and patent attorneys.  
 34. Hunt et al., supra note 30, at 840–42. 
 35. Id. at 834.  
 36. Id.  
 37. See Waverly W. Ding et al., Gender Differences in Patenting in the Academic Life Sciences, 313 SCI. 
665 (2006); Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Women Inventors in Context: Disparities 
in Patenting Across Academia and Industry, 22 GEN. & SOC’Y 194 (2008) [hereinafter Whittington & 
Smith-Doerr, Women Inventors]; Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Gender and 
Commercial Science: Women’s Patenting in the Life Sciences, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 355 (2005) [hereinafter 
Whittington & Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science]; G. Steven McMillan, Gender Differences in 
Patenting Activity: An Examination of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, 80 SCIENTOMETRICS 683 (2009).  
 38. Whittington & Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science, supra note 37, at 360; Whittington 
& Smith-Doerr, Women Inventors, supra note 37, at 207.  
 39. Whittington & Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science, supra note 37, at 364–365; Ding, 
Murray, & Stuart, supra note 37, at 666; McMillan, supra note 37, at 690.  
 40. See Paula E. Stephan & Asmaa El-Gainainy, The Entrepreneurial Puzzle: Explaining the Gender 
Gap, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 475 (2007). 
 41. Whittington & Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science, supra note 37, at 358, 360; see 
generally Ding et al., supra note 37.  
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This gap in innovation is economically significant, representing by one 
estimate a loss of 2.7% U.S. GDP per capita.42  While it is difficult to account for 
the deficit in female patenting, ethnographic work has begun to suggest some of 
the underlying reasons.  The causes of the patent gender gap are likely complex, 
arising from an intricate milieu of deeply-seated social factors.43  Women may 
have been socialized to take fewer risks, to push their projects less aggressively, 
and to think about commercialization of their work less often than their male 
counterparts.44  Venture capitalists and other start-up funding sources that might 
support invention development may take female innovators less seriously, and 
view their inventions less favorably than they would the inventions produced by 
similarly situated men.45  Women may be either intentionally or inadvertently 
excluded from opportunities and institutions, such as advisory boards or 
business consultancies, that would facilitate opportunities for innovation, and 
women may otherwise lack the social connections that are often vital to 
innovation development.46 
Thus, it is clear that there are severe impediments to female participation in 
the patent system, and every indication is that social biases and historic 
subordination serve to create such innovation barriers.  And here the parallel to 
earlier work on modulating the patent statute to accommodate industry-specific 
innovation profiles is striking.  Much as the firms in some economic sectors, 
innovating in particular technological environments, will experience the patent 
system in a radically different way than firms in other environments, so a wealth 
of data indicates that female inventors will experience the patent system in a 
radically different way than an otherwise similarly situated male counterpart.  
The female inventor is more likely to face disapproval and resistance to securing 
a patent, and is less likely to have access to the expertise and resources necessary 
to bring an innovation to fruition. 
Of course, the particular obstacles faced by the female inventor could be 
addressed by means of add-on incentives along the lines of “Patents for 
Humanity.”  We might provide special prizes or reduced application fees for 
female patent applicants, or provide subsidized loans or specialized grants to 
finance innovation by female inventors.47  And such programs may well be 
desirable for any number of reasons; just as the gender disparity problem likely 
stems from the interaction of a variety of innovation deterrents, so overcoming 
the problem will likely require a suite of ameliorative efforts.  But the barriers 
before female innovators appear in large measure to be barriers to product 
development and commercialization. These are precisely the kind of 
impediments to innovation that the patent system itself is intended to address, 
 
 42. See Jennifer Hunt et al., Why Don’t Women Patent? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17888, 2012). 
 43. See Fiona Murray & Leigh Graham, Buying Science and Selling Science: Gender Differences in the 
Market for Commercial Science, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 657, 660 (2007).  
 44. Id.at 483; Stephan & El-Gainainy, supra note 40, at 479–80. 
 45. See Stephan & El-Gainainy, supra note 40, at 481. 
 46. Id.; Ding, Murray, & Stuart, supra note 37, at 666–67. 
 47. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Non-Patent Innovation 
Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing alternate incentive mechanisms for 
innovation). 
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although the conventional supposition is that these impediments will arise due 
to systematic economic factors rather than systematic cultural or social factors.  
Whatever the source of the impediments, the existing statutory system includes 
at least some tools, or policy levers, to combat them. 
IV. POLICY LEVERS 
The general concept of policy levers in intellectual property is now well 
established, and has become a fixture in the analysis of the patent system.48  In 
previous work with Mark Lemley, I have argued that the patent statute can and 
indeed must incorporate “policy levers”—that is, doctrinal standards that are 
mutable and responsive to the characteristics of new technologies, new 
industries, and even the changed circumstances of existing industries.49  
Different technologies have different commercialization profiles; industries 
based on those technologies face different innovation challenges.  For example, 
although creating new candidate molecules in pharmaceutical research is fairly 
simple, characterizing, testing, and securing regulatory approval for new drugs 
is an enormously expensive undertaking.  By contrast, developing a new 
software product, although technically complex, is orders of magnitude less 
expensive.50  A very substantial incentive is needed to prompt the investment of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in a new drug; a much smaller incentive, or 
perhaps no incentive at all, is needed to prompt the necessary investment to 
produce new software. 
Thus, providing the necessary patent incentive to commercialization 
necessarily varies with the challenges faced by a particular industry.  It is 
impossible to foresee what challenges an industry may face.  Some technologies 
will be nascent, emerging, or entirely unknown when a statute is formulated, 
meaning that the legislature cannot have the information necessary to specifically 
provide incentives for the innovation configuration of industries based on those 
technologies.  Consequently, the patent statute must be equipped to allow 
ongoing modulation of the level of reward available to meet the needs of 
different economic contexts.  Lemley and I argued that our current patent statute 
contains such provisions, which we term “policy levers,” and that courts are 
particularly well positioned to employ such levers.51  Different statutory 
 
 48. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property 
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics 
of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2001); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1747 (2011); Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of 
Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229 (2014). The concept has also experienced an uptake in other 
areas of legal analysis. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory 
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353 (2003) (international banking law); Seth L. Cooper, Seeing Competition, 
Eyeing Regulation: FCC Wireless Policy Following the Wireless Report, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 41 
(2011) (telecommunications law); Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 440 (2009) (tax); Alex Rice Kerr, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, 34 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 69 
(2010) (environmental law). 
 49. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 
(2009); Burk & Lemley, supra note 2; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-
Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2003). 
 50. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 49 at 39–40. 
 51. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2.  
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provisions within the patent statute provide differing tailoring tools to vary the 
scope, quantity, or characteristics of patents by industry. 
To take only one example of such a provision, out of many possible levers: 
as mentioned previously, to qualify for a patent, an invention must be deemed 
“non-obvious,” that is, it must comport with a requirement set out in section 103 
of the patent statute.52  Section 103 provides that a patentable invention cannot 
have been obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art”—sometimes 
abbreviated to the acronym PHOSITA—when taken as a whole, at the time a 
patent application was filed.53  The statute specifies considering the context of a 
particular technology or “art” in deciding whether to award a patent.  Thus, 
applying this provision requires tailoring the legal standard to specific 
technologies; what is obvious to a person of ordinary skill in one art may not be 
the same as what would be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in a 
different art. 
Indeed, the levels of ordinary skill in different arts will vary according to 
specific circumstances over the lifetime of the particular field.  In order to satisfy 
the statutory standard, courts reviewing patents, and the United States Patent 
Office issuing patents, will have to inquire into the characteristics surrounding 
specific technologies to know what would be obvious in each of them.54  
Developments in technologies in which innovation is easier will be more likely to 
be obvious, and so those areas will receive fewer and narrower patents, which is 
the proper outcome from a policy standpoint, since less incentive is needed there.  
Developments in technologies in which innovation is more difficult will be more 
likely to be judged non-obvious, so that those fields receive more and broader 
patents, which is the correct policy outcome, as more incentive is needed to 
overcome the obstacles faced by innovators in those fields. 
Such flexible standards allow decision makers to tailor a unitary statute that 
would otherwise be “one size fits all” to meet the needs of diverse industries.55  
In the previous published work on such policy levers, our major concern was the 
calibration of economic patent incentives to the innovation profiles of various 
industries, so as to offer the proper reward to innovators.56  But there is no divine 
decree or law of nature that mandates patent incentives must be solely calibrated 
to optimize the benefit of the system to innovation producers.  This is purely a 
choice of social policy.  As the White House “Patents for Humanity” initiative 
suggests, it is entirely possible to calibrate the patent system according to the 
needs of innovation consumers.  This possibility has been largely overlooked, 
probably in large measure because of the assumption that once an incentive is 
available to overcome barriers to investment in what is essentially a public good, 
competitive market forces will prompt the production of output that meets the 
needs of consumers. 
As I have already noted, the “Patents for Humanity” program, together 
with the Leahy-Coons bill, implicitly recognizes both that, without intervention, 
 
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015). 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).  
 55. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 49, at 109.  
 56. See id.  
Burk Proof_EK_CK_12-23-2015 (Do Not Delete) 1/4/2016  6:12 PM 
36 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 23:25 2015 
market failures or other impediments will keep certain beneficial innovation 
from occurring, and that patent incentives can and sometimes should be nudged 
in a direction that benefits particular classes of consumers.57  Such nudges might 
be accomplished through an external program such as the added rewards of 
“Patents for Humanity.”  But such add-on incentives may not be necessary.  If 
the patent system is already loaded with policy levers, these might be employed 
to the same ends as an add-on program, without the need to devise new 
incentives.  The necessary tools may already be available in the statute.  Patents 
could be calibrated to address more than one type of market failure. 
I have observed in other work that the patent system comprises a 
networked ecology of constituent communities.58  Patent doctrine could be 
attuned to address failure in any of them.  One could, for example, calibrate 
various policy levers in the patent statute to optimize the system for the benefit 
of the courts or the Patent Office.59  (Indeed, one might sometimes worry that 
exactly this has happened, perhaps without the sanction of the legislature.)  It is 
unclear that optimizing the system for the benefit of judges or bureaucrats would 
be desirable as a general policy, although certain aspects of the system probably 
ought to be tailored for administrative efficiency.  Similarly, one might adjust 
various policy levers to optimize the system for the benefit of patent attorneys 
and other advocates.  Again, it is unclear that this would be sensible as an overall 
goal, although certain aspects of patent doctrine such as inequitable conduct 
should likely take into account the role of an inventor’s representative or 
advocate.60 
To achieve the goals of “Patents for Humanity,” doctrinal policy levers 
might be calibrated to increase the likelihood of a patent, or increase the 
magnitude of a patent reward, where the innovation in question might offer 
particular benefit to impoverished or economically disadvantaged populations.  
The availability of the patent might, for example, allow price discrimination 
between wealthy and less wealthy populations, allowing the former to subsidize 
the latter.61  To take the example of the PHOSITA obviousness lever, policy 
analysis of the obviousness standard in patent law has long recognized that this 
lever plays a critical role in responding to the degree of uncertainty that attends 
innovative activity, and particularly in fostering the chancy development of 
newly discovered technologies.62 
Decisional models of the obviousness standard indicate that the patent 
system should reward the innovator who develops a new invention when it is 
more likely than not that an invention will not succeed.63  The riskier an 
innovation is, the less likely it is to succeed; the less likely it is to succeed, the 
larger the incentive needs to be to prompt investment.  Non-obvious inventions 
are risky inventions, and receive a patent reward when successful.  Typically the 
 
 57. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reymann, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 26 L. & LIT. 163 (2014) 
 59. See id. at 185–86. 
 60. See, e.g., Therasense Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson, Inc., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (setting 
standards for inequitable conduct before the Patent Office).  
 61. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVE 37 (2004).  
 62. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992). 
 63. Id. (sketching a decisional model for obviousness determination).  
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risk taken is a technological risk, but innovation also entails regulatory or 
financial risks.64  Such risks could well include innovation where the return on 
investment will likely be impeded by the poverty of the most likely consumers of 
the innovation, but where the inchoate social benefit of the invention would 
nonetheless exceed the private cost of development.  The PHOSITA who 
succeeds in developing beneficial technology in the face of such an impediment 
could be said to have a non-obvious invention. 
V. DEPLOYING DIVERSITY LEVERS 
The same rationale holds for failures of the patent system to engage the 
innovative capacity of traditionally marginalized groups.  Just as the patent 
system incorporates certain assumptions that may restrict the type of innovation 
available to impoverished populations, it also appears to incorporate 
assumptions that limit the innovation produced by female innovators.  Evidence 
of the sort I have detailed above, demonstrating the dramatic failure of the patent 
system to engage women, suggests as an initial matter that “progress,” under 
pretty much any socially plausible definition of that term, is being impeded.  But 
such evidence also suggests ways in which the existing levers in the patent 
stature might be deployed to begin addressing the gender patenting gap. 
Taking once again my example of the Section 103 PHOSITA policy lever, we 
can draw a clear parallel to the deployment of the obviousness standard across 
industrial sectors.  It is clear that the PHOSITA working on software 
development is quite different than the PHOSITA working in biotechnology.65  
But by the same token, the woman of ordinary skill in biotechnology experiences 
innovation and patenting very differently from her male counterpart.  
Statistically, she is significantly less likely to develop discoveries into 
innovations, and is far less likely to seek a patent for patentable innovations.66  
The result is an effective shift in the contextual standard for non-obviousness; 
where the male biotechnology innovator will recognize and develop an 
innovation, the female biotechnology innovator, hampered by social and cultural 
impediments, may not.  The corollary is that innovation by women in 
biotechnology is in turn significantly more likely to be extraordinary—that is, 
innovation in this context, against heightened odds, is more likely to constitute 
non-obvious innovation. 
Recognizing this difference within the PHOSITA standard could mean that 
innovation by women should be more amenable to patentability in at least one 
respect.  As described above, the obviousness standard is generally seen as a 
lever that increases the incentives for success in the face of uncertain innovation 
outcomes, essentially rewarding risk-taking.67  Here I simply point out the 
gendered context of such an uncertainty assessment under the standard.  The 
uncertainty of success is assessed from the point of view of the person having 
ordinary skill in the art, but that uncertainty is higher for a woman of ordinary 
skill.  We know that female innovators are far less likely to develop a promising 
 
 64. BURK & LEMLEY supra note 49, at 39. 
 65. Id. at 63–64. 
 66. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.  
 67. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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technology, meaning that the ostensibly neutral obviousness standard 
incorporates a de facto gendered assumption about risk-taking.68  Recognizing 
that the woman of ordinary skill faces a gender gap avoids the assumption that 
the PHOSITA makes a masculine uncertainty assessment and assists in 
overcoming the impediments faced by female innovators. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court opened the door to this type of inquiry in its 
landmark 2007 opinion on patent obviousness, KSR v. Teleflex.69  The United 
States patent statute says that obviousness must be judged against the 
understanding of a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent technology, but, 
as a practical matter this means that the adjudicator of obviousness must have 
some evidence of what the PHOSITA would know.  A court, or the Patent Office, 
like any decisional forum, must have a record in the form of documents, or 
testimony, or other evidence of the relevant facts in order to make its 
obviousness judgment.70  Prior to the KSR decision, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over 
all patent cases, had required very explicit documentary evidence of an 
invention’s obviousness in order to deem it unpatentable.71  The result was of 
course that many patents were issued because documentary evidence was 
lacking, rather than because the invention was a real advance over prior 
technology. 
In KSR, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s standard was too 
rigid for the realities of actual product development.72  In assessing obviousness, 
the Court held that the standard must take into account unwritten “design 
incentives and other market forces” that may prompt the PHOSITA to make 
changes to existing technology in predictable and evident fashion.73  The opinion 
similarly counsels that the standard incorporates the unwritten “inferences and 
creative steps” ordinarily available to the PHOSITA as a matter of “common 
sense,” even if those considerations are not explicit in the literature.74  Thus, the 
KSR opinion specifically contemplates taking into consideration the social and 
economic context in which the PHOSITA works.  Sometimes, the PHOSITA’s 
surroundings will facilitate the ability to envision the claimed invention, making 
the invention more obvious.  Presumably the PHOSITA could likewise face 
contrary design incentives, market forces, and influences that could impede his 
ability to formulate the claimed invention, making the invention less obvious. 
It is a small step from taking into account the design incentives, market 
pressure, and similar ambient influences on the PHOSITA, to similarly take into 
account the challenges the PHOSITA might face in devising and developing new 
inventions under pervasively adverse social conditions.  Risk, success, and 
certainty are all socially determined perceptions.  Aspects of such perceptions are 
in fact taken into account in the obviousness “secondary factors” articulated by 
 
 68. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 69. KSR Int’l Co. v Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
 70. See Burk, supra note 28, at 1030. 
 71. 550 U.S. at 418–19. 
 72. Id. at 415.  
 73. Id. at 417.  
 74. Id. at 420. 
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the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere.75  In Graham and its companion 
opinion, United States v. Adams,76 the Court held that inventive success in the face 
of contrary teachings, against the advice and expertise offered by others of skill 
in the art, is strong evidence of non-obviousness.77  Stated differently, an 
inventor who succeeds in innovating in the face of pervasive contrary social 
pressure, lack of funding and commercialization opportunities, and sparse 
encouragement or financial support, is more likely to have a non-obvious 
invention. 
VI. THE WOMAN OF ORDINARY SKILL 
The Section 103 policy lever thus provides an example of a patent metric 
that can be tailored to circumstance, including the impediments to innovation 
that might be considered under a standard of innovation appropriate to the 
woman of ordinary skill in the art.  Of course, in this particular instance, taking 
such contextual obstacles into account pushes the obviousness standard in the 
opposite direction from the ambient influences considered by the Supreme Court 
in KSR; they could make an invention less likely, rather than more likely, to be 
obvious.  But not all “diversity levers” will necessarily increase the availability or 
frequency of patenting in targeted circumstances.  Some levers, responding to 
social impediments in innovation, may decrease the availability of patents. 
Patents are believed to offer incentives that on the whole benefit progress, but 
those incentives come at a cost.  It is entirely possible that certain social goals 
might be furthered by restricting, rather than augmenting the availability of 
patents in targeted fields. 
This approach may seem to fragment the PHOSITA standard, potentially 
changing a general objective metric into a series of narrowly specialized 
assessments.  Complete particularization of the standard would of course shift 
the objective standard into a subjective standard, taking into account the 
individualized circumstances of innovation, yielding an actual knowledge metric 
measuring innovation according to the actual circumstances and abilities of a 
particular inventor.  But this is not a call for a subjective standard; the PHOSITA 
standard already contains multitudes.  The PHOSITA facing high-cost 
pharmaceutical development is not the PHOSITA facing Silicon Valley garage 
software coding.  And as Mark Lemley and I have pointed out, circumstantial 
application of patent policy levers will inevitably result in discrete industry- or 
technology-specific metrics.78  This effect is a version of Carol Rose’s famous 
observation that no legal imperative is composed entirely of bright-line rules or 
of completely malleable standards; rather, law typically processes between the 
two.79  Fact-sensitive standards will sometimes encounter repeated patterns of 
circumstance, and where this occurs, a rule-based expectation will coalesce 
around the common fact pattern.  Such elaboration of particularized applications 
within a general standard is a normal and sensible development in the law. 
 
 75. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 76. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 77. Graham, 383 U.S at 17–18; Adams, 383 U.S. at 52. 
 78. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 49 at 110. 
 79. Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).  
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Thus, parallels to a discrete “woman of ordinary skill” standard already 
exist in other areas of law that employ legal constructs conceptually related to 
the PHOSITA.  Commentators have long observed that patent law’s PHOSITA is 
in some sense a close relative of the “reasonably prudent person” found in 
Anglo-American tort law;80 both are personified fictional images that define legal 
criteria.81  Like the PHOSITA, the reasonably prudent person embodies 
contextually and factually specific application of a legal rubric.82 The reasonably 
prudent person is intended to articulate an objective standard of behavior 
incorporating the particular circumstances of the actor.  But of course this means 
that courts have over time developed a limited set of variants on the reasonably 
prudent person where particular circumstances favored a standard that was 
routinely different than that calibrated to the general population. 
One such variant on the reasonably prudent person, the reasonable child, 
assesses proper caution within the limited ability appropriate to a child under 
the circumstances.83  Another variant, the reasonable professional standard, is 
calibrated to the proper degree of caution that might be expected given the 
ability of a professional, such as a physician or attorney, who has an 
extraordinary degree of expertise.84  And, for purposes of the statutorily created 
tort of sexual harassment, some courts have developed and applied a specialized 
reasonable woman standard for determining when conduct should be viewed as 
offensive or damaging.85  The similar development of a particularized objective 
standard within the PHOSITA construct would thus not be unusual where a 
personified legal standard is used to specify policy outcomes. 
An alternate concern might be that modulating the standard in this fashion 
could contribute to the problem at issue; that fashioning a separate “woman of 
ordinary skill” metric might seem to denigrate the abilities of female inventors 
by defining a PHOSITA that is less able to discern the claimed invention.86  But 
such concern is largely misguided.  First, the PHOSITA is a legal metric, 
 
 80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). The reasonable person also appears in various 
other branches of law, such as criminal law. See Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual 
Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2010) (discussing the 
different areas of the law utilizing the reasonable person standard). 
 81. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co. 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (comparing 
the PHOSITA to the “reasonable man” in tort law). 
 82. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the 
“Odious Creature,” 23 OKLA. L. REV. 410, 426–27 (1970).  
 83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965).  
 84. See id. § 299A; see also id. § 289(b) (stating that superior training or attributes possessed by an 
actor are to be taken into account in determining reasonableness). 
 85. See e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 
128, 137–38 (1st Cir. 2002); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 116 (3d Cir. 1999); Torres 
v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997). The possibility of a reasonable woman standard for the 
general law of negligence has additionally been the subject of extended commentary. See Naomi R. 
Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1991); see also MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN 
EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD (2003) (arguing that characteristics such 
as gender, race, and class should appropriately be incorporated into the reasonable person standard). 
 86. Versions of this objection have long been recognized as a concern in other areas where a 
reasonable woman standard might apply. See Cahn, supra note 85, at 1415; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break 
in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 64 (1989).  
Burk Proof_EK_CK_12-23-2015 (Do Not Delete) 1/4/2016  6:12 PM 
 DIVERSITY LEVERS 41 
calibrated to achieve a particular legal result, which takes into account, among 
other factors, the skill and training of inventors in a given technical field.  Neither 
the familiar generalized PHOSITA standard nor the proposed woman of 
ordinary skill standard indicates the actual capability of any particular inventor 
or group of inventors. 
Additionally, such concerns offer no valid reason to avoid correcting the 
gender gap, any more than similar concerns would be a reason to avoid 
correcting gender issues such as harassment.  There is nothing demeaning about 
adjusting a legal standard to cure socially imposed imbalance.  Just as an 
employment environment of sexual innuendo and “horseplay” will look very 
different to a reasonable man than it will to a reasonable woman given the 
history and circumstances of harassment in society, so too may the environment 
of assertion and self-promotion surrounding commercial innovation look very 
different to the reasonable man than it does to the reasonable woman.  Women 
need prove neither that they are tough enough to endure harassment, nor that 
they are aggressive enough to personally overcome the innovation gender gap. 
Indeed, even within patent law as it currently exists, the PHOSITA is not a 
monolithic concept, but shifts character depending upon the purpose to which 
the standard is oriented.  The PHOSITA appears at a variety of junctures in 
patent law; the patent statute references the standard not only in Section 103, but 
again in Section 112.87  Section 112 requires the applicant for a patent to disclose 
the invention in sufficient detail to allow the person of ordinary skill to make and 
to use it.88  But previous commentators have noted that the PHOSITA of the 
Section 103 obviousness standard is not necessarily the PHOSITA of the Section 
112 enablement standard.89  The Section 103 obviousness PHOSITA appears to be 
more creative, more of a thinker, and more of a risk-taker than his 112 
counterpart.90  The 112 PHOSITA indeed seems to be a bit of a dullard, more 
conservative and pedestrian in his approach to the prior art.91  This difference 
makes sense, as the two constructs take into account the purposes of their 
respective policy levers. 
This division also reminds us that adjusting the PHOSITA standard for 
some purposes need not mean adjusting it for all purposes.  The PHOSITA in 
Section 112 is engaged in following the teachings of the patent; the 112 PHOSITA 
embodies the standard for disclosure of the invention in the patent document.92  
The empirical literature I have referenced does not suggest that the woman of 
ordinary skill has any less knowledge or ability than her male counterpart.  In 
fact, evidence shows quite the contrary—the contributions of women who do 
engage in innovation are comparable in quality to that produced by men.93  Thus, 
there is no reason to think that the woman of ordinary skill would have any 
 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2015). 
 88. Id. 
 89. John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA - The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37, 52–53 (1991). 
 90. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Grout, 377 
F.2d 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 91. Tresansky, supra note 89, at 54.  
 92. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 49, at 146–47. 
 93. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
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particular difficulty reading and following the teachings of a patent beyond 
whatever difficulty the conventional PHOSITA might have.  Only if there were 
reasons to think that some gendering of patent disclosure dictated a more 
detailed disclosure requirement would it be necessary to adjust the 112 
PHOSITA standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent law, like many other seemingly neutral areas of law, entails social 
biases that become apparent only on close examination.  I have focused here on 
the use of policy levers to address systematic gender bias in the patent system, 
and have primarily explored the use of a single lever, the Section 103 
obviousness PHOSITA, in that regard.  I have focused here on gender in large 
measure because there already exists a fairly robust literature devoted to 
investigating the gender gap in innovation.  The existence of the gap is therefore 
well documented and characterized, and we are beginning to understand its 
origins.  This type of information is critical to guide the application of policy 
levers to resolve diversity issues, and the Section 103 PHOSITA standard offers a 
clear example of how a particular diversity lever might operate against such a 
background. 
There are of course many other policy levers in the patent statute, and some 
of them may also prove to be useful in addressing aspects of the patent gender 
imbalance.  Additionally, as I hope I have made clear throughout this article, 
gender does not define the only form of bias that may impede progress in science 
and the useful arts.  My argument regarding diversity levers is likely salient for 
other social biases, such as those associated with race.  There is for example a 
nascent literature investigating African-American innovators, which indicates a 
deficit in patenting among that social classification.94  As the dimensions of this 
and similar problems become clearer, some diversity levers may be useful in 
correcting them. 
Finally, I am well aware that I have adopted here a rather modest, “first 
wave” position regarding diversity and the patent system.  I have largely 
assumed that, even within its own utilitarian paradigm, the patent system is 
failing in its stated goal to promote innovation if certain classes of innovators are 
either wittingly or unwittingly hindered from participation on grounds that are 
arbitrary vis-a-vis the goals of the system.  I have similarly assumed that, so long 
as we have a system that confers certain societal benefits and advantages, 
women, impoverished communities, or other under-represented groups who 
wish to participate in the system would be better off if they were not arbitrarily 
excluded.  One could of course question whether we ought to have a patent 
system at all,95 or, if we have one, whether it should not have radically different 
 
 94. See Lisa D. Cook & Chaleampong Kongcharoen, The Idea Gap in Pink and Black (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16331, 2010) (exploring similar patenting deficits among 
female and African-American inventors); see also Lisa D. Cook, Violence and Economic Activity: Evidence 
from African-American Patents 1870-1940, 19 J. Econ. Growth 221 (2014) (finding linkage between 
declining African-American patenting activity and racial violence). 
 95. See Immaculada di Melo-Martín, Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to 
Patent More?, 19 SCI. & ENG. ETHICS 491 (2013) (questioning whether enhanced participation in 
patenting would be socially desirable). 
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goals than those commonly assumed.96  But that is a more controversial 
conversation for the future; even without a radical re-thinking of the patent 
system there is already copious evidence for deploying diversity levers to 
achieve the commonly accepted goals of intellectual property. 
 
 
 96. See Burk, supra note 14, at 918 (suggesting plausible alternative objectives for the patent 
system). 
